The information provided below relies on our monthly global conflict tracker, CrisisWatch, and qualitative assessments provided by Crisis Group’s analysts based in or near conflict areas. The selection is not exhaustive, and should be read in conjunction with country/regional reports and other early warning products.

In the November 2025-April 2026 edition of On the Horizon, we showcase entries on Bangladesh, DR Congo, Lebanon and South Sudan. 

1. The February 2026 election is an inflection point for stability

• The next government – likely to be led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) – will face huge pressure to implement the July Charter, a package of reforms negotiated by 30 political parties. Failure to do so could trigger unrest.
• Local violence could disrupt voting. Notably, elements favouring the Awami League (the party of deposed leader Shekih Hasina, who was sentenced to death in absentia in mid-November) may seek to discourage balloting through violence or intimidation, which could result in clashes with state forces. Activists from parties taking part in the vote could seize control of polling stations or fight with supporters of rival candidates in hotly contested races.
• Electoral authorities will face major logistical challenges, including enabling some of the estimated 15 million citizens overseas to vote for the first time. Spoilers could weaponise disinformation to undermine the polls’ legitimacy or stoke popular unrest.

To Watch: What happens in the debate over a referendum on the July Charter and its implementation post-election; whether the BNP wins a majority or forms a coalition; whether the next government or International Crimes Tribunal extends the ban on the Awami League (which is barred from politics at least until trials are over) or provides space for its rehabilitation; whether the Awami League seeks to undermine the election through violence and/or disinformation campaigns.

Potential Consequences: The election might catalyse sporadic violence that the interim government has struggled to contain since August 2024. Should the next government slow-roll or refuse to implement the July Charter, opposition parties may take to the streets in protest, which could spark disturbances.

2. Rohingya armed groups could destabilise the Bangladesh-Myanmar border

• Rohingya armed groups, having struck a truce in response to the Arakan Army’s seizure of Myanmar’s Rakhine State in 2024, are expected to continue cross-border attacks on the Arakan Army. These could morph into a full-fledged insurgency, with the groups trying to seize territory in Rakhine.
• Insurgent operations could trigger new refugee flows into Bangladesh at a time of diminishing international aid. Attacks will also damage inter-communal relations in Rakhine State, putting some 400,000 Rohingya civilians at risk of reprisals and getting caught in the crossfire.
• Retaliating for Dhaka’s alleged support for Rohingya groups, the Arakan Army might seek to destabilise the Chittagong Hill Tracts, a restive region along the Myanmar border.
• The incoming government in Bangladesh will seek to restart dialogue with the Arakan Army and might try to limit the activities of Rohingya armed groups.
• Rohingya armed groups could step up recruitment in the Cox’s Bazar refugee camps amid growing hopelessness among refugees over repatriation prospects. Funding for food support – at $12 per person per month – will run out in March, absent new pledges. Dhaka may allow more livelihood activities for refugees to reduce aid dependency.
• Worsening camp conditions are expected to fuel irregular movements of Rohingya to third countries, particularly Malaysia. If funding dries up further, Bangladeshi security officials may advocate for coercive tactics to repatriate some or all of the 1.2 million refugees.

To Watch: Whether next government will alter policy on Rohingya, including stronger action against Rohingya armed groups; whether refugee response funding will dwindle; whether Rohingya leaders and Arakan Army engage in dialogue.

Potential Consequences: Rohingya armed groups’ attacks may prompt reprisals from the Arakan Army, worsen inter-communal relations and push more Rohingya to seek refuge in Bangladesh. Without policy shifts on livelihoods or sustained international support, desperate Rohingya refugees could join armed groups, resort to crime or pay smugglers to reach Malaysia or Thailand. 

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1. Diplomatic breakthroughs are unlikely to stem fighting

• Kinshasa and the M23 will probably blame each other for failing to honour the Doha framework agreement. The two sides have voiced conflicting interpretations of key provisions, notably on restoring the country’s “territorial integrity”.
• Continued foot dragging and disputes between the DRC and Rwanda over the sequencing of their commitments look set to undermine both the mineral deal and the Washington peace agreement signed in June.

To Watch: Implementation of the first two protocols of the Doha framework concerning prisoner exchange and ceasefire monitoring, and negotiations over the other six; any impatience among mediators with the recalcitrant parties.

Potential Consequences:

• A collapse of the diplomatic tracks would reduce the likelihood of a negotiated settlement and could help trigger an escalation of fighting, including a renewed M23 push to expand its territory.
• While unlikely, progress on implementing the first protocols of the Doha accord could build confidence and pave the way for a ceasefire to hold; if carried out, the initial cooperation agreement between the DRC and Rwanda could revive momentum for follow-through with the June accord and provide impetus for a summit.

2. The conflict could escalate and expand beyond North and South Kivu

• The M23 and Rwandan forces could press south toward Tanganyika province in the Katanga region, which remains a key objective for the rebellion. As first steps, they could target Uvira, the last major city in South Kivu still under government control, or intensify efforts to open National Road 3 toward Shabunda (South Kivu) and Kindu (Maniema province).
• They might also continue pushing west toward Tshopo province through North Kivu’s Walikale and Masisi territories.
• Congolese and allied forces will put up resistance to the expansion, and could attempt to take back captured territory, but Kinshasa’s inability to manage the Wazalendo militias will weaken their shaky alliance and make a coordinated pushback elusive, leaving the M23 and Rwanda with the upper hand. 

To Watch: Extent of the Burundian forces’ involvement in South Kivu; number of UN personnel who remain in North Kivu’s capital Goma, now fully M23-controlled, after MONUSCO’s mandate is renewed in December. 

Potential Consequences: 

• Further fighting will deepen the humanitarian crisis, driving additional displacement and pushing more people into extreme hunger just as the World Food Programme may have to halt emergency food assistance in the eastern provinces in early 2026 due to funding shortfalls.
• A battle for Uvira, located directly across the border from Bujumbura, would probably heighten tensions between Rwanda and Burundi.
• The M23 advancing into the Katanga region, the DRC’s economic heart and former President Joseph Kabila’s stronghold, would represent a major challenge to President Félix Tshisekedi’s rule.

3. The political scene will probably grow increasingly polarised

• Kabila may redouble efforts to dislodge Tshisekedi, including by inducing splits in the army. He launched a new opposition platform, Save the DRC, in October – weeks after being sentenced to death in absentia for supporting the M23.
• Tshisekedi will probably seek to maintain control of the army by deepening a patronage system that benefits senior officers and by taking additional steps to purge high-ranking security officials, mainly those who were close to his predecessor.

To Watch: The government accusing its political opponents of sedition and complicity with the insurgency, and the opposition describing the government as failed and illegitimate. 

Potential Consequences: 

• Growing polarisation will greatly complicate preparations for the 2028 general elections.
• While unlikely in the coming months, should Tshisekedi’s government fall, it would lead to unrest in working-class neighbourhoods of Kinshasa, the stronghold of his party and his Kasaï community, as well as in the Kasaï provinces. 

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1. The ceasefire’s gradual degradation may result in sudden collapse 

• Israel is expected to continue cross-border attacks. It may claim that progress in Hizbollah’s disarmament is insufficient and expand its bombardment, launching a countrywide campaign to destroy Hizbollah’s alleged assets.
• Israel is likely to continue occupying positions in southern Lebanon and mount further ground incursions, which the Lebanese army will come under growing public and political pressure to confront. Incursions threaten to undermine the army’s credibility and could lead to a direct clash between the two militaries.
• The Lebanese army may move to seize Hizbollah’s weapons north of the Litani River without having agreed on this course with the group, risking a confrontation with Hizbollah fighters.
• While, for now, its leaders prefer to refrain from retaliating against Israel, Hizbollah may seek to rearm south and north of the Litani. Or it may switch to a more confrontational approach.

To Watch: Army’s end-of-2025 deadline to disarm Hizbollah south of the Litani; army’s reaction to Israeli ground incursions; another war between Israel and Iran, raising pressure on Hizbollah to enter the fray; Hizbollah’s ability to regroup and rearm.

Potential Consequences: Israel could intensify its military campaign and shatter the truce. If the Lebanese army tries to disarm Hizbollah without the group’s blessing, it risks triggering deadly conflict with Hizbollah or street protests by Shiites, which could also turn violent. In a worst case, the army directly confronting Hizbollah could prompt Shiite soldiers to desert or defect to fight alongside Hizbollah.

2. May 2026 elections – if not delayed – may deepen political divisions

• Parliamentary deadlock over amendments to electoral laws, concerning the right of expatriates to vote for all 128 seats as opposed to six specially assigned ones, could lead to a postponement of elections scheduled for May 2026.
• Elections, if they do go ahead, may become a contest over Lebanon’s position vis-à-vis Israel and Hizbollah’s future role, which may reopen fault lines dating back to the civil war and spur rising tensions among opposing groups.
• A major fight over Hizbollah’s future could spark intra-Shiite conflict, particularly if the group seeks to silence dissenting voices and/or opponents seek to drive a wedge between long-time allies Hizbollah and Amal.

To Watch: Whether parties can compromise on electoral law disputes; whether the government enters talks with Israel and how Hizbollah responds; what happens in intra-Shiite relations.

Potential Consequences: Domestic polarisation could trigger another breakdown of the political process. In a worst case, Hizbollah could seek to trigger a constitutional crisis by withdrawing from the government or mobilising its supporters for mass street protests.

3. Daunting economic and reconstruction challenges cast a long shadow

• The government may further slow-roll reforms mandated by the International Monetary Fund to address the financial crisis that has crippled the country and impoverished many citizens since 2019.
• The government will likely struggle to attract billions of dollars from international funders needed for reconstruction. Key potential donors condition large-scale aid on Lebanon making progress on reforms.
• Israel may continue its policy of preventing reconstruction with attacks on building sites and equipment, particularly in Shiite areas in the south, keeping tens of thousands displaced. 

To Watch: Draft law on allocating losses from the banking crisis; funding for reconstruction, particularly from Gulf Arab states; Israeli aerial attacks on rebuilding efforts.

Potential Consequences: A failure to implement reforms could keep Lebanon in a never-ending economic crisis. Israel’s anti-reconstruction policy could backfire, triggering renewed support for Hizbollah to retaliate aggressively or the formation of new armed groups in the south.

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1. Jockeying over the presidential succession could set off a power struggle

• Kiir will likely continue his purge of senior government and security officials, as shown by the dramatic removal in November of Benjamin Bol Mel, once thought to be his chosen successor. The succession battle is expected to shift focus to figures like the president’s daughter, Adut Salva Kiir, ratcheting up tensions in the capital Juba further.
• Disgruntled elites from Kiir’s camp may defect to a new movement formed by Nhial Deng, a prominent politician who has vowed to “wrest control” of the ruling party from the president.  
• The trial of Machar – who faces treason, murder and crimes against humanity charges – is set to continue, exacerbating government-opposition frictions. A number of Machar’s lieutenants who fled the capital are already preparing for war.

To Watch: Kiir’s health; possible moves to bolster Adut Salva Kiir; defections to Deng’s new party; progression of Machar’s trial.

Potential Consequences:  

• Absent broad consultation or consensus among political elites on a transition, an all-out power struggle could erupt in Juba when Kiir departs. Even if he stays in office, the president has made sweeping changes to the regime that have deepened fissures within it, which could prove destabilising.
• A guilty verdict for Machar could trigger major violence. If he remains held incommunicado, his movement could also break up, fracturing the political landscape further.  

2. The deepening political crisis will likely stoke sub-national violence

• Hostilities between Kiir’s South Sudan People’s Defence Forces and Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition are set to continue. Other armed opposition factions, such as the National Salvation Front led by Thomas Cirillo and the Lou Nuer militia, are also increasingly active.
• Disaffected elites in Juba could mobilise local armed groups as proxies in their political disputes. Some are even seeking external support in anticipation of a multi-sided struggle.
• Inter-communal and other local violence could worsen, exacerbated by climate shocks and resource competition. 

To Watch: Possible Nuer-led assault on strategic towns in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states; future of the Ugandan mission, which supports Kiir but may not be able to stay indefinitely; risk of outside actors, such as the Sudanese army, backing anti-government factions.

Potential Consequences: Escalating sub-national violence could deepen the severe humanitarian crisis and, coupled with political tensions in Juba, push the country into a new, multi-front civil war. 

3. The war in Sudan will aggravate South Sudan’s myriad challenges

• The Sudanese army could again shut down major oil facilities, which South Sudan relies upon to export its crude, in order to squeeze Juba for its alleged support for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
• Proxy activity along the border will almost certainly grow, with South Sudanese politicians and militias allying with either the Sudanese army or the RSF for weapons and support, increasing the capacity of various rebel factions to mount an offensive.
• The three Arab powers closest to Sudan’s warring parties – the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia or Egypt – could back one faction in Juba with the aim of pulling South Sudan toward their side in Sudan’s conflict.

To Watch: RSF drone strikes on Sudanese oil facilities; Kiir’s deepening relations with Abu Dhabi (the RSF’s main backer); U.S.-led diplomatic efforts to end Sudan’s conflict; a shutdown of oil exports.

Potential Consequences: 

• The further disruption of oil flows could strain South Sudan’s fragile economy and deprive Kiir of the revenue needed to grease his patronage network, sharpening the political crisis.
• The growing involvement of Sudan’s belligerents in South Sudan could incite a rise in proxy warfare in the country. 

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