On the night of 28 to 29 January, detonations rang out across Niger’s main international airport and a military air base known as Base 101. For nearly an hour, gunmen who had infiltrated the area roamed around and fired weapons in the vicinity of commercial and military aircraft and various buildings. The response by Nigerien troops and Russian allies left twenty assailants dead, according to the military-led government. Eleven others have been detained. Satellite imagery shows damage to at least three Base 101 hangars; regional carriers Air Côte d’Ivoire and Asky Airlines reported that their passenger planes, parked on the tarmac, require repairs.

Hours later, General Abdourahmane Tiani, who assumed the presidency after a 2023 coup, said the presidents of France, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire had “sponsored” the attack. Abidjan and Cotonou strongly rejected the accusations. On 30 January, the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-Sahel) claimed responsibility via its Amaq news agency.

The incident marks the first major jihadist assault in the capital Niamey since Islamist extremists began targeting government troops in the early 2010s (the capitals of Mali and Burkina Faso were first struck in 2015 and 2016, respectively). It also hit one of the military regime’s nerve centres. Base 101 is where most of Niger’s military aircraft and drones are stationed. The facility hosts Russian forces and nearly 300 Italian troops (who work under a bilateral support agreement after most European countries halted security assistance in the coup’s wake), as well as the newly established counter-terrorism unit of the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES), gathering troops from the bloc’s three members, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Stockpiles of uranium concentrate that authorities are trying to sell after nationalising a mine near the town of Arlit are reportedly also stored there. 

Niger has until now been less affected by jihadist violence than its two AES partners, but its security threats are intensifying. The region’s two main jihadist groups – IS-Sahel and Jama’t Nusratul Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) – have permeated western Niger. Since 2024, their fighters have moved ever closer to the capital. Many believe there is a growing jihadist presence in certain suburbs. In October 2025, suspected IS-Sahel fighters abducted a U.S. missionary from his home in central Niamey, just a few hundred meters from the presidential compound.

Secondly, jihadist attacks are shifting toward urban targets. While Sahel’s militants often make incursions into cities, they have mainly waged war in rural areas and remote border zones. But in recent months, these groups have turned their focus on urban areas, imposing a fuel blockade on Mali’s capital Bamako, sabotaging economic infrastructure and ambushing supply convoys on trade routes. 

Niger’s leadership will likely reinforce its counter-terrorism measures, and could tighten the controls on civil rights that it introduced in the name of the anti-jihadist fight. In December, the authorities passed a general mobilisation law allowing it to requisition private property and forcibly mobilise civilians. Still, the airport attack suggests there are limits to the deterrence effect of purely military methods.