U.S. President Donald Trump sent shockwaves through Iraq’s political firmament earlier this week when he berated the nomination by the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework (SCF) of Nuri al-Maliki for another term as prime minister. In a post on Truth Social, Trump said that the country had descended into chaos during Maliki’s previous stints as premier, between 2006 and 2014, and warned that, if appointed, the U.S. would no longer come to Iraq’s assistance.

Iraq has not figured high on the Trump administration’s priorities until now. But broader geopolitical concerns, particularly Washington’s determination to curb Iranian influence in the country, seem to have prompted direct intervention in Iraq’s struggles to form a new government. The U.S. administration had previously made clear that it would not tolerate representatives of Iran-linked armed groups in the government – and believes these forces are among Maliki’s political allies.

Maliki’s nomination is equally controversial at home. His terms as prime minister were marked by rampant corruption and a high tide of polarisation, deepening the sectarianism that culminated in ISIS’s breakneck growth. Concerns over his legacy convinced Iraqi political forces to embrace an informal norm against prime ministers serving more than one term, with the aim of preventing any individual from capturing the executive branch. As a result, incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani has been denied backing within the SCF for a second term, even though his alliance won the largest number of seats in parliamentary elections last November.

Most observers had expected a compromise candidate would emerge, with Shiite power-brokers openly admitting their preference for a weak consensus premier willing to do their bidding. Deepening instability in the region, above all in Syria and Iran, nevertheless appears to have convinced them that more assertive leadership is needed to prevent any harm to Iraq.

Having suffered a public rebuke from Trump, as well as an earlier warning from the U.S. embassy against his nomination, Maliki and several other SCF leaders this week denounced U.S. interference in domestic politics. The cost of ignoring Washington may prove too high for Iraq’s political establishment to stomach. Washington has many levers of influence to pull. It might sanction Iraq for any help to Iran in evading its own U.S. restrictions, or penalise individuals in government if members of armed groups designated by the U.S. as terrorists assume ministerial posts. The U.S. could also strangle Iraq’s access to dollars given the proceeds of the country’s oil sales are deposited into an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; cut military assistance; or even deploy force against Iraqi armed groups that come to Iran’s aid.

For now, Trump’s public opposition to Maliki has reshaped calculations within the Shiite Coordination Framework. The SCF is now seeking a face-saving way to relinquish Maliki’s nomination and may either reconsider Sudani or opt for a compromise prime ministerial candidate. Whatever the outcome, the work of the next Iraqi government in balancing U.S. demands with the need to assuage pro-Iran groups has grown far more complicated.